Summaries here and here and here and some immediate reaction here, which belies a benighted bullheadedness which promotes rather than works to defuse tensions.
Questions remain as to just what did occur. At this point, the obtuse and sketchy statements out of the DPRK and the lack of provision of any corroborating data do bolster speculation that what exploded was not what was announced that exploded.
North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency announced the test took place Monday morning local time and seismic activity consistent with a nuclear explosion was detected by geologists in both South Korea and Australia. It occurred in the northeast of the country near the town of Kilju, an area that had been under U.S. surveillance as a possible test site because of the excavation of several deep tunnels there.
North Korea warned China that it was about to test and the Chinese passed the information on to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. President Bush was informed Sunday night shortly before the test took place.
[snip]
North Korea is an economic basket case underwritten by Chinese food and energy aid. This is ironic as the country’s governing ideology is still ‘juche,’ roughly translated as ’self-reliance,’ developed by Kim’s father Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s founding president known as the Great Leader. North Korea’s economy outperformed that of South Korea, measured by per capita GDP, until the mid-1970s. Today, however, South Korean economists estimate that their country’s GDP is around 40 times that of its northern neighbor.
If China were ever to pull the plug on its flow of aid to North Korea it would precipitate a crisis. North Korea is counting that China will never do that and it is not in China’s interests to do so. China’s policy toward the Korean peninsula has two goals: the peninsula should be nuclear free, and stable.
[snip]
The Chinese are increasingly frustrated that Kim is forcing such unpleasant choices upon them and it is beginning to show. Kim ignored China’s warnings against the missile tests of July 4 and the North Koreans refused to receive the diplomat dispatched by Beijing after the launch. China responded by supporting U.N. Security Council sanctions against the sale of any missile technology to North Korea. This was a first for China even though they modified a much tougher resolution initially proposed by Japan. Article
Requiring the most delicate and intense of diplomatic tools, the woebegone G. Walker administration is now quite bereft of skilled staff, those with expertise and standing having been subsumed or driven out by ideologues and neocon black-and-white warhawks. Sadly too, one gets the impression that anyone tapped as a special envoy would either chafe at the constrictions that would undoubtedly accompany the position or outright refuse in light of the rhetoric, record, grandstanding and showboating evidenced by Rummy, Cheney, Bolton, Rice, et al.
The hope in Washington is now that Chinese President Hu Jintao will decide he’s finally had enough of his out-of-control former junior partner. With Sunday’s test Kim has now twice rebuffed Hu’s pleas for restraint. The last time was July, when Kim ignored the Chinese leader’s request not to test missiles. This time Kim insulted Hu the day after an important Sino-Japanese summit with Tokyo’s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe—a nationalist who will no doubt be probing China’s strategic determination—and on the eve of a big communist party plenary session at which Hu’s reputation will be on the line.
For Washington, almost everything is riding on this hope.…
[snip]
…only days after China orchestrated a framework agreement in September 2005 that promised the North it would be rewarded if it abandoned its nuclear program, including with a civilian nuclear reactor, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia that effectively froze the accounts of Kim and other North Korean elites. The action is believed to have so riled Kim that he refused to return to the talks.
Now the hardliners have won the day. There are unlikely to be any carrots offered for quite a while to Kim after he posed what President Bush on Monday called “a threat to international peace and security” that “defied the will of the international community.” Still, Washington is gambling on quite a number of still-untested premises. It is gambling that Hu Jintao will be angry enough to sponsor a strategic shift in his country’s view of North Korea; until today Beijing has been reluctant to do anything that might lead to regime collapse. And it is gambling that the regime itself is moribund. Article
Written just before yesterday’s announcement of a weapons test, the points stand with a new prescience.
…From the perspective of Pyongyang, when confronted by the reality of significantly decreased economic aid and the recent freezing of financial accounts by two of its remaining semi-allies in China and Vietnam (upon the request of the United States), elevating this nuclear blackmail strategy to the next logical level likely constitutes the regime’s only available option.
Pyongyang’s perception of a world united against its security and economic interests compounds this desperate rationale, driving the nation to engage in a downward spiral of wartime propaganda, military brinksmanship, and saber rattling. Exacerbating the precarious situation has been the well-documented failure of the Six Party Talks to achieve its agreed-upon objective, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Preoccupied with the Iraqi debacle, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Iranian nuclear ambitions, the Bush administration, since last November’s most recent Six Party Talks breakdown, has largely ignored the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons, passively acknowledging that while these weapons may exist, the security dynamic of the region would remain unchanged until the technology was demonstratively proven.
[snip]
…For all their toughness, militancy, and self-discipline, North Korea is an extremely impoverished and desperate nation. Desperate and militarily strong is, of course, a very dangerous combination. As such, the United States has a responsibility at this point in time to step in while we can, cast aside an ineffectual strategy, and offer North Korea the opportunity of direct talks. Failure to do so, as we may see in the coming days, will lead to further hostility and a nuclear change in the regional balance of power. Article
More:
On Sept. 19, 2005, North Korea signed a widely heralded denuclearization agreement with the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. Pyongyang pledged to “abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.” In return, Washington agreed that the United States and North Korea would “respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize their relations.”
Four days later, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sweeping financial sanctions against North Korea designed to cut off the country’s access to the international banking system, branding it a “criminal state” guilty of counterfeiting, money laundering and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction.
The Bush administration says that this sequence of events was a coincidence. Whatever the truth, I found on a recent trip to Pyongyang that North Korean leaders view the financial sanctions as the cutting edge of a calculated effort by dominant elements in the administration to undercut the Sept. 19 accord, squeeze the Kim Jong Il regime and eventually force its collapse. My conversations made clear that North Korea’s missile tests in July and its threat last week to conduct a nuclear test explosion at an unspecified date “in the future” were directly provoked by the U.S. sanctions. In North Korean eyes, pressure must be met with pressure to maintain national honor and, hopefully, to jump-start new bilateral negotiations with Washington that could ease the financial squeeze. When I warned against a nuclear test, saying that it would only strengthen opponents of negotiations in Washington, several top officials replied that “soft” tactics had not worked and they had nothing to lose.
[snip]
North Korea is divided between hawks who favor nuclear weapons and pragmatists who are pushing for economic reforms and a denuclearization deal with the United States. Just as the engagement policy pursued by the Clinton administration strengthened the pragmatists, so the Bush shift to a regime-change policy has given the initiative to the hawks. Article
And a clearly put day-after analysis:
The immediate effect will be that there will be a lot of tough talking - mostly from the Americans and Japanese.
In the long-term there isn’t realistically much that the rest of the world can do about this. The international community has very few options.
A military attack from America is out of the question because it would result in a significant war. South Korea wouldn’t stand for that and I do not think the American public would either.
I think we will see sanctions. There may be some sort of shipping blockade but that won’t have much of an impact as North Korea does not have significant trade.
I do think that the only way forward is engagement. We may not like cosying up to a profoundly obnoxious regime but there are no alternatives.
[snip]
China is not likely to do anything that will precipitate the fall of the North Korean Government as if they do, they will have large numbers of refugees bringing them all sorts of problems. The Chinese will talk tough for a while but will want to avoid a sudden collapse.
That’s why sanctions won’t work. You can’t have sanctions without the co-operation of China. They do not want all the chaos and unpredictability that a collapse will bring. Article
U.N. recap.
US-proposed Security Council sanctions over North Korea’s atom-bomb test would include international inspection of inbound and outbound cargo to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a Western diplomat said Monday.
[snip]
Last week, Japan, which chairs the council for October, and the United States had pushed for inclusion of a threat to slap an arms embargo and other trade and financial measures under Chapter Seven of the UN charter, if North Korea went ahead with its test.
But in the face of opposition from China and Russia, the explicit mention of sanctions was removed from a non-binding statement adopted by the council Friday. Article