Inheriting a long-running debacle, a change of tack — actually using the prevailing winds rather than gallumphing headlong into them?

Richard Holbrooke, Barack Obama’s new envoy for Afghanistan, General James Jones, the new White House national security adviser, and General David Petraeus, the new commander of the Afghan campaign, all stressed that the US president’s policy on the Taliban and al-Qaida would be governed by “attainable goals” matched by “adequate resources”.

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“Obama’s objectives will be much more moderate,” said a senior European policy-maker involved in discussions with the Obama team. A senior Nato official said Washington’s emphasis on Afghanistan was shifting to “being much more realistic”, adding: “It doesn’t need to be a democracy, just secure.”

“The new policy will be not just winning hearts and minds, but winning hearts, minds, and stomachs,” said another senior diplomat working in Kabul. “It’s realistic. Realism is good.”

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Holbrooke signalled a sharp change of tack on Afghanistan, saying: “We’ve inherited a situation of grand rhetoric and inadequate resources, both military and civilian. We need to understand what our goal is in Afghanistan.” Source

What about Obama versus Bush on handling this war? Does Obama have any advantages over Bush?

Well the advantage Obama has is his intellect. He’s going to ask somebody, “O.K., what are we going to accomplish here?” I don’t think that was asked when we went in 26 days after 9/11. I think we went in because we were angry and we had to do something. I don’t know that we had a plan. I think Obama will look at this and ask–unlike the Bush administration–”What are we trying to get out of this? Somebody tell me.”

If you had to counsel Obama, what would you say the goal should be?

My difficulty in answering that question is that I have such a problem with the fact that we’re already in there. That is such a big mistake that once you have made it, everything else seems to fail. We are there, so obviously we want to avoid the humiliation that everybody else has suffered in getting out, and we want to leave behind something that will walk back the damage already done by the fact that we have engaged in this war.

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Right now, it seems the U.S.-backed government and the U.S.-led coalition are in the same predicament that most other occupiers have found themselves in, eventually, which is controlling the main towns but having no control over the countryside. Is that accurate?

That’s a fair assessment. I mean, we spent huge amounts of money to build the Kabul to Kandahar Road, but nobody can travel it safely. Nobody is controlling all of Afghanistan from the center. And while we may not have reached that tipping point, in the overworn term, of a generalized resistance like the ones that forced out the Soviets, the British, the Moguls, and Alexander the Great–we’re close to that. And the policies that we come up with in this new administration will either move us over the tipping point, or back away from it.

So let’s talk about Obama and his plan. He’s talking about doubling the U.S. troop force, from about 34,000 to something like 60,000. Is that correct, as you understand it?

Well, the numbers are interpreted with a lot of leeway. [He wants to add] three brigades, which can run from 20,000 to 30,000 troops. I think that’s a nice campaign position, but once you’re president you’re going to say, “Are the numbers important, or is the mission–the redefinition of the mission–more important?” My sense is that if you send more gunfighters, you get into more gunfights. And I don’t think that’s ever worked out for anybody. There’s precious little experience that would point to the fact that we can kill enough Pashtuns to where they’d say, “I don’t want to do this anymore.”

So far, the U.S. strategy has been to isolate the Taliban. Are you saying that’s not possible?

You know, you have to start with this question: What are the Taliban? You would be correct if you described the Taliban as a Pashtun movement. If you described all the people that you’re engaging in combat operations with as “Taliban,” you’re including a lot of criminal gangs, you’re describing a lot of kids being paid to carry guns, you’ve got a lot of local-interest Pashtuns, and you’ve got some of the fervent Muslim, faith-driven Taliban. I don’t know what the proportions are of each group. But the point is, we’re going to have to start-over and define who our adversary is and what our mission is. And then we have to ask, “What kind of deals can I possibly work out along the way if I’m not convinced that I can kill enough of these people to bring them to heel?”…

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…The problem we face in Afghanistan and Pakistan goes beyond Taliban and al-Qaeda. A big piece of Afghanistan and Pakistan are in total turmoil, if for no other reason than because we’re there.

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Do you think there’s a moderate Pashtun force that would be willing to say, “We’re not going to run our country in the way that the Taliban did”? Because it would be hard for the U.S. to turn things over to a Taliban-style government.

There may be some Taliban that are moderate. We call every pissed off Pashtun a Taliban, just like every pissed off Vietnamese was V.C. We’re going to have to consider providing enough security–not going out and doing kinetic operations–so that they can regenerate the traditional, tribal elder system and build their own security. We’re calling this “militias” now, [but we need indigenous forces that can say,] “O.K., this is our district. We’ve lived here for 20,000 years, and we’re going to pull ourselves together. All I want from you, America (or the Canadians, or the Dutch, or whatever, the Brits), is a little security. We’ll have our share, we’ll do our thing, and we’ll even accept some arms and money to police this area.” And it may be Taliban Pashtuns that were somehow associated with it that will do it, and then they put up their sign that says, in their own Pashto language, “Don’t mess with Texas.” Or, “Don’t come into this district if you want to behave badly.” And if that happens, maybe you can make some progress. But if we don’t look at that, then we end up with “kinetic operations” and sending more guns and fighters to the gunfights, and publishing more body counts. Source